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This article represents an opinion by Robert 
Shulman, who as all know is one of the most 
senior scientists in the field of neuroener-
getics, having made major contributions 
to field of NMR applied to biology. Robert 
Shulman is also a deep thinker in the explo-
ration of the relationships between brain 
activity and mental life. We feel that this 
personal view on the role that metabolic and 
vascular imaging as a reflection of neuronal 
activity may bring to the understanding of 
mental life, together with a critical appraisal 
of the limitations of such techniques, is of 
interest to the field. Hopefully this opin-
ion will stimulate further reflections from 
readers interested in this topic. Comments 
of the readers on this essay would be most 
welcome.
Pierre Magistretti, Specialty Chief Editor, 
Frontiers in Neuroenergetics
Recent advances in imaging have encouraged 
neuroscientists to investigate previously 
unanswerable questions about brain func-
tion. Scientists from the many disciplines 
of neuroscience–psychology, computer 
science, linguistics, neurochemistry, and 
cognition – are designing imaging experi-
ments intended to explore their views of 
brain activities. Because the images measure 
glucose and oxygen consumption and the 
rate of blood flow that supplies these nutri-
ents, the experiments track the traditional 
physiological parameters of brain energy 
consumption and metabolism. However 
the experimental possibility of measuring 
changes in brain properties during behav-
ior such as the response to cognitive tasks, 
sensory stimulation, and the remembrance 
of events and instructions, have encouraged 
studies of mental processes considered to 
underlie these behaviors. Views of mental 
processes are not only diverse, but their 
study raises questions about reliability that 
long ago were settled in physical chemistry. 
For example, if I want to talk about my for-
getfulness with my wife as in “My memory 
is failing – I forgot that I was supposed to 
play poker last night,” memory is a very 
useful concept. However modern imag-
ing experiments raise the question as to 
whether experiments designed to measure 
rates of glucose consumption that explain 
“memory” are as reliable as experiments 
that measure glucose incorporation into 
glycogen. Questions about the meaningful-
ness of the different kinds of experiments 
allowed by imaging chemical reactions in 
the body can be illustrated by comparing 
two recent applications of these methods.
Physical studies of diabetes
Studies of Type 2 Diabetes and the brain 
responses during a memory task both 
measure chemical reactions of glucose a 
common source of human energy but, it 
will be seen, interpret this information very 
differently. Type 2 Diabetes has been around 
– and has been observed – for thousands of 
years. The great Indian physician Sushruta 
(fl. sixth century BCE) identified the disease 
(Stephen et al., 2001) and characterized it by 
ants being attracted to the urine of patients. 
Now, after 2000 years of study, we identify 
the disease by the patient’s high blood glu-
cose and by his slow return to normal blood 
sugar levels after a glucose infusion. We 
know of the damages wrought by the high 
glucose and recent studies using magnetic 
resonance spectroscopy (MRS) have shown 
that its immediate cause is down regulation 
of the insulin control of glucose storage as 
muscle glycogen (Shulman and Rothman, 
2001). These metabolic results are one step 
in the changing understanding of this dis-
ease. Our scientific understanding uncov-
ers layers of observables – from the sweet 
smell that once identified the disease to the 
present biochemical mechanisms contrib-
uting to the high blood glucose. There is 
in this typical research history not a single 
step but an unveiling of mechanisms that 
with time have moved the level of enquiry 
to the molecular level. In the case at hand of 
diabetes we now understand the biochemi-
cal conditions which cause the disease and 
allow us to control its symptoms. Clearly it 
had not been possible until very recently to 
explain this disease at a molecular or cellular 
level but from the very beginning of its his-
tory its defining properties were observable 
and measureable. The story of our unfold-
ing analysis, understanding, and control of 
Type 2 Diabetes is one of the triumphs of 
the scientific method.
Methods for brain studies
The road to understanding brain activ-
ity has, like our path to understand-
ing Diabetes, been much traveled with 
advances made possible by methodologi-
cal discoveries. Long before the nineteenth 
century insights by physiologists, and the 
subsequent elaboration of neurons, axons, 
and synapses we have records from the 
beginning of the sixteenth century when 
for a brief period autopsies were allowed 
in Florence. Leonardo, whose continuing 
interests in brain anatomy had been inter-
rupted by a temporary ban on the study 
of cadavers, returned to study the brain’s 
ventricles. Studies of peripheral nerve con-
nections to the ventricles since Galen’s time 
had been inconclusive because the ventri-
cles collapsed when the brain drained upon 
being excised. da Vinci’s (1992) beautiful 
drawings of the preserved ventricles were 
made possible by casting techniques he 
brought with him from his ambitious plans 
for a horse statue. He filled the ventricles 
with a soft wax that flowed at a warm tem-
perature and which solidified when the 
temperature was lowered. The cast of the 
brain provided by this innovative method 
disproved the existence of neuronal con-
nections to the ventricles which had been 
believed for more than a 1000 years.
At present and in conjunction with other 
approaches in neuroscience, progress in 
brain studies is being fueled by the chemi-
cal and metabolic information provided 
by non-invasive imaging methods. Non-
invasive methods of fMRI, MRS, and PET 
are responsible for a stunning story of our 
growing ability to look into the complexities 
of brain chemistry and physics. In contrast 
to the muscle, liver, heart, and kidney, all 
of which can be excised from the body and 
maintained in a living state on the bench 
top, the brain must be studied in the living 
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(sometimes called “working memory”) 
had been identified by invasive electrodes 
in a specific brain region in non-human 
primates, we might look for an analogous 
response in the human brain. The reigning 
psychological paradigm of cognitive neu-
roscience assumed that a particular region 
would be specifically and exclusively moti-
vated by a single activity – in the case at 
hand, working memory. We did the experi-
ment and found that a particular frontal 
region indeed was active when the person 
was doing a task that required remember-
ing, and we published the results (McCarthy 
et al., 1994).
However, in the excitement of finding 
a localized brain response to a psycho-
logical concept we had been too excited 
to subject the important claims of cog-
nitive neuroscience to the crucial test of 
whether the localized response was unique. 
Our subsequent, more careful, controlled 
experiments showed that the same region 
was activated when the subject merely 
paid attention to a stimulus that did not 
require remembering (Shulman, 1996). 
These results, which tested the assumption 
that there was a unique region respond-
ing to what was called, “working memory,” 
contradicted the psychological model. The 
upshot of these experiments was that the 
same region was activated during a task 
requiring attention (and many other activ-
ities) without the person being required 
to remember an earlier event (Shulman 
et al., 2002). Since the regional activation 
was not a sufficient response to remem-
bering as postulated by cognitive neurosci-
ence, in order to understand what brain 
activity could tell us about psychological 
activities it seemed necessary to unpack 
the assumptions and findings of cognitive 
neuroscience. The results of this endeavor, 
proposed in 1996, (Shulman, 1996) are 
summarized in this article.
These experiments and subsequent 
studies made it evident that we are work-
ing within assumptions about understand-
ing when we use physical measurements 
to identify psychological processes in the 
brain. When studying cerebral metabolism 
and energetics, as in the synthesis of gly-
cogen in Type 2 Diabetes, it had not been 
necessary to re-examine epistemological 
assumptions about the scientific method. 
My Path into neuroscience
As a biophysicist I have been enthusiastic 
about physical studies that can reveal the 
molecular or cellular mechanism of bio-
logical processes – that is what biophysicists 
and physiologists do. The achievements 
of physiology testify the successes of this 
method – the energy consumption of mus-
cle work, the circulation of blood and the 
understanding of diseases provide explana-
tions and opportunities for control at the 
molecular level. The surging discoveries 
in molecular biology supported by novel 
non-invasive techniques for studying brain 
activities have encouraged neuroscientists 
to add brain function and psychological 
processes to the topics that can be studied 
at the molecular level. The question for the 
practicing scientist becomes – what are the 
criteria for selecting biological phenomena 
that can be studied with the expectation of 
finding explanations at the physical–chemi-
cal level? I have come to my own answers 
about these questions only after decades of 
research, and some notable wrong turns.
I had been doing magnetic research since 
the 1950s and in the early 1990s, when using 
MRS to study neurophysiology, I took an 
excursion offered by the discovery of fMRI 
(Kwong et al., 1992; Ogawa et al., 1992) 
which showed that localized changes in 
brain activity in response to sensory stim-
ulation, such as shining light in the eyes, 
could be detected. Soon after Seiji Ogawa’s 
demonstration of fMRI with Kamil Ugurbil, 
both he and Kamil, former colleagues from 
my years at Bell Labs, came to our Yale 
laboratory to extend their original meas-
urements on our NMR equipment which 
Andrew Blamire and Douglas Rothman 
had modified so as to do fMRI experiments 
(Blamire et al., 1992).
At this time the field was ablaze as reports 
accumulated of fMRI responses to various 
stimuli in numerous laboratories, including 
reports of brain activities during cognitive 
tasks like remembering a room or executing 
a numerical task. In that heady atmosphere 
where it seemed that mysteries of the mind, 
in the category of memory and conscious-
ness, were being revealed as regional brain 
activations, I asked a knowledgeable col-
league what well-established mental activity 
we could study on our equipment that had 
already measured brain responses to light. 
My colleague, Patricia Goldman-Rakic, 
person. To this end the possibilities of non-
invasive studies of brain activity in vivo have 
created a wave of excitement in neurosci-
ence, and rightfully so.
Measurements of the cerebral flow of 
blood and metabolism showed that the 
brain obtained energy and synthesized 
metabolic products by oxidizing glucose. 
These non-invasive methods, in conjunc-
tion with other approaches have made it 
possible to measure and localize cerebral 
metabolites, thereby allowing us to directly 
follow metabolism in humans. These devel-
opments have created a wide range of possi-
ble directions for neuroscience. In addition 
to metabolic studies of the brain, in which 
results at the molecular level are similar to 
those responsible for our present under-
standing of Type 2 Diabetes, neuroimaging 
research has also turned to studying mental 
processes like “memory” or “consciousness.” 
There are thousands of reports on efforts to 
localize brain regions responsible for mental 
processes whose origins are to be found in 
many disciplines particularly psychology 
although rapidly being extended to the 
social sciences like economics and politi-
cal science.
This article will focus on the similari-
ties and differences of scientific method 
between these two kinds of studies – of 
the metabolism responsible for Type 2 
Diabetes and of the brain participation in 
mental processes. While it will focus on the 
uses and misuses of non-invasive investiga-
tions of brain function and metabolism, it 
is also a more basic story of how we posit 
and pursue questions in scientific research. 
It is about observation and modest asser-
tions – meaning that it is meant to be a cel-
ebration of what we can accomplish in the 
conduct of observation, experimentation, 
and analysis, and the danger of allowing a 
priori assumptions to have undue influence 
on the conduct of our science. Novel brain 
results from non-invasive methods spark 
the temptation to reach further – to assume 
that our research allows us insight into con-
sciousness or other mental or psychological 
concepts that make us the human beings 
that we are. I will ask how we have gone 
from measurements of brain chemistry to 
assertions about the mind, the soul, and 
to ask whether chemistry should seek to 
explain such matters as how we vote on 
tax-reform.
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nomenon of brain activity to take place. We 
have reached the ultimate in understanding 
brain activity when it is expressed in its dif-
ferent components of action potentials and 
energy consumption which are describable 
in measurable chemical terms of the phe-
nomenon. That understanding is not of the 
original descriptions of the phenomenon, 
which was the kind of brain activity that 
could be identified by lesions or neuroim-
ages, but it was that activity reduced to 
more physically explainable mechanisms. 
To describe how a phenomenon happens 
at the physical–chemical level is the goal of 
the starting observations. The conditions 
that are necessary for the phenomenon to 
occur explains how it happens, and addi-
tional studies at the electro-chemical level 
can amplify our understanding by con-
necting it with other physical processes 
but they do not describe why it happens. 
When we try to describe why something 
happens we are hoping to have understood 
it at a deeper level, where the explanation 
is complete and is uniquely responsible 
for the event. In arguing that we cannot 
go beyond physic-chemical explanations 
Bernard was addressing the vitalist’s views 
that there were fundamental forces such 
as the élan vital whose explanatory powers 
provided a more fundamental explana-
tion of why bodily processes occurred. In 
denying the possibility of explaining why 
something happens, Bernard was fighting 
a recurrent position in history. Newton’s 
laws of gravitation were dismissed by some 
philosophers in his day as having merely 
provided an explanation of Kepler’s laws 
in terms of a physical law of gravitational 
attraction, and were criticized for not hav-
ing provided an explanation of why two 
bodies attracted each other with a force of 
gravity.
In looking for an explanation of human 
behavior by brain processes we are limited 
to processes that provide necessary sup-
port for behavior. Physical experiments 
can find necessary explanations at the 
chemical or physical level, but they can-
not justify these explanations by appealing 
to a higher authority because there is no 
higher authority than physical and chemi-
cal explanations. When brain activations 
are attributed to psychologically postulated 
mental processes such as consciousness, 
When we come to the issue at hand, 
as to how far physics and chemistry can 
explain the workings of the human brain, 
we can profit from the analyzes offered by 
history. The excitement felt today is a con-
tinuation of the innovative experiments in 
the nineteenth century by Claude Bernard 
and Hermann von Helmholtz who laid 
the foundations of the physiology we are 
extending. Bernard proposed methods for 
physical and chemical explanations of bod-
ily processes by insisting that the object of 
scientific research ‘is the same for living 
bodies as for inorganic bodies; it consists 
in finding the relations that connect any 
phenomenon with its immediate cause, or 
putting it differently, it consists in finding 
the conditions necessary for the appearance 
of the phenomenon” (Bernard, 1957a). To 
identify these connections Bernard pro-
posed that phenomena be disassociated 
into simpler phenomena until finding “con-
ditions that cannot be analyzed (further) 
in the present state of science”: in other 
words into chemical or physical processes 
or mechanisms. The goal was to discover 
the necessary chemical or physical mecha-
nism that caused a phenomenon, and in this 
way we would understand as well as pos-
sible how processes occurred. However, he 
continued, “The nature of our minds leads 
us to seek the essence or the why of things. 
Thus we aim beyond the goal that it is given 
us to reach, i.e., for experience soon teaches 
us that we cannot get beyond the how… 
the immediate cause or the necessary con-
ditions of phenomena. In this respect the 
limits of our knowledge are the same in 
biological as in physical–chemical sciences” 
(Bernard, 1957b).
In neuroscience brain activities are tradi-
tionally disassociated into elementary elec-
trical, chemical, and structural processes. 
When brain activity is described at the 
electro-chemical level of ion movements 
across membranes or at the physical level 
of energy consumption it is, for the present 
purposes, not reducible further, because the 
chemical flux of ions and brain energy are 
in today’s science, the ultimate explanations 
in chemical–physical terms – the hope of 
biological explanations. To reach this rest-
ing point, where no further break down is 
needed, we have to decompose the general 
description of activities attributed to the 
brain into these components. Thus we can 
However, in studying topics like working 
memory we are not just measuring meta-
bolic responses to clearly defined sensory 
stimulations by light, sound, or odors; we 
are not counting beans, we are trying to look 
at activities of the mind. People have many 
ideas, opinions, and words to describe the 
mind, or to decompose it into components 
like working memory, that are so commonly 
used they seem to be obvious facts about 
the world. Like many others, I was eager 
to locate brain activities that supported 
our mental life. But as our experiments 
showed, “working memory” was not being 
located in the world. Instead it seemed to 
be an assumption, an hypothesis about 
brain activity – an hypothesis that was not 
supported by the experiments. The many 
reports of cognitive concepts followed by 
fMRI showed that our results were typical 
of experimental reports in this active field, 
in that attempts to identify unique brain 
locations supporting a concept have failed 
(Fodor, 2000; Shulman et al., 2002; Friston, 
2009). Most directly these results raise the 
question as to how studies of mental pro-
cesses differ from scientific investigations 
capable of explaining more material pro-
cesses such as Type 2 Diabetes.
Powers and liMits of Physical 
exPlanations
From the early empirical refining of met-
als to today’s understanding and control 
of man-made materials we can trace the 
advances in the physical and chemical 
understanding of non-living phenomenon. 
The highly developed understanding of 
the inorganic world has continuously been 
extended to the living world of plants and 
animals including humans. Our subject is 
part of this great historical movement in 
which studies are broadening to explain the 
physics and chemistry involved in human 
phenomenon such as health and behavior. 
Applications of the laws of physical sci-
ence to biological molecules like proteins 
and DNA have encouraged beliefs that we 
are only at an early stage of applying these 
laws to living processes. Given the rapid 
progress in modern biological research 
directions such as generated by genetics, 
computer data handling, and brain imag-
ing it is difficult to imagine what limits exist 
on the understanding that can rightfully be 
expected from biophysical research.
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find a single reproducible response for a 
term such as working memory but rather 
find different brain regions responding that 
depend upon the context in which the word 
is used (Fodor, 2000; Shulman et al., 2002; 
Friston, 2009). These results are in agree-
ment with the pragmatist’s view that there 
is no substance to the word other than in 
the actions it generates.
Why do I claim that biological processes 
like the immune response, genetics, and 
metabolism, can be explained in physical–
chemical terms while mental processes like 
memory and consciousness cannot be? The 
simple answer is that inheritance of traits, 
the immune response, and metabolism are 
activities that can be observed and measured 
while the psychological processes described 
as memory or intention are not observables 
but are hypotheses created by theories that 
help us describe the world.
francis crick’s study of 
consciousness
The distinction in neuroscience between 
experiments designed to reduce conceptu-
alizations of biological phenomena to mole-
cules and cells and experiments designed to 
find molecular and cellular mechanisms of 
observables can be seen clearly in the studies 
of consciousness. Consciousness is a central 
interest today of neuroscientists attracting 
discussions from its many sub-disciplines. 
Journals, books, associations, and an annual 
meeting all specifically address the study of 
consciousness.
It may come as no surprise that the search 
for a molecular basis of consciousness has 
been led by Francis Crick, whose great elu-
cidation of the DNA structure led to the 
field of molecular biology, the twentieth 
century revolution in biology. In 1994 Crick 
focused the study of consciousness when in 
his book, The Astonishing Hypothesis: The 
Scientific Search for the Soul (Crick, 1994a 
page 7), he stated: “our minds – the behav-
ior of our brains – can be explained by the 
interactions of nerve cells (and other cells) 
and the molecules associated with them.” 
Crick defines the terms of his reductionist 
approach in this way: “a complex system can 
be explained by the behavior of its parts,” 
and proposes that the reduction needs to 
go no further than finding explanations at 
the neural or chemical level using the laws 
of classical physics.
of incantation that binds him you can con-
trol the spirit, genie, afriete, or whatever the 
power may be.
… So the universe has always appeared 
to the natural mind as a kind of enigma. Of 
which the key must be sought in the shape 
of (an) illuminating or power-bringing 
word or name. That word names the uni-
verse’s PRINCIPLE and to possess it is, after 
a fashion, to possess, the universe itself. 
“God,” “Matter,” “Reason,” “The Absolute,” 
“Energy,” are so many solving names. You 
can rest when you have them. You are (at) 
the end of your metaphysical quest. But if 
you follow the pragmatic method, you can-
not look on any such word as closing your 
quest. You must bring out of each word its 
practical cash-value, see it at work within 
the stream of your experience. It appears 
less as a solution, than as a program for 
more work, and more particularly as an 
indication of the ways in which existing 
realities may be CHANGED (ITALICS AND 
CAPS ARE JAMES’S).
What I understand James to be saying is 
that the existence of a word does not solidify 
a concept. We have not defined “truth” or 
“memory” just because we have words for 
them. A concept like “working memory” 
is defined by the actions its leads to and 
therefore is intrinsically dependent upon its 
specific usage or the context in which it is 
identified. When we claim working memory 
is found in a person who is remembering 
recently observed numbers or faces or the 
third last word he saw we are not starting 
with the observation of a general property 
found in all cases, like the sweet smell of 
urine identifying diabetes, but are proposing 
there is a general concept that underlies all 
these observations. However a word is not a 
specific tangible creation; it is an hypothesis 
that a person finds useful when dealing with 
the world. We can profitably use a word like 
memory to describe how well something 
is remembered by a person or group, (or 
whether I am habitually forgetting my poker 
dates) but it is a long stretch to assume that 
the word memory used to describe a student 
reciting the multiplication table is the same 
thing as the word that Marcel Proust used 
to describe what was evoked by the smell of 
madeleines. It is difficult to see how reliable 
empirical brain activities, like the neural 
correlates of consciousness, or activations 
of specific brain regions in an fMRI experi-
ment, might be found for such a word. And, 
memory, or intention, which are postu-
lated to underlie behavior, instead of to 
the observed behavior, these experimental 
results are presumed to tell us why the indi-
vidual responds to stimuli, or remembers 
or intends to perform an act. It is possible 
to find brain activities necessary for an 
observable human performance: a func-
tioning medial temporal lobe is necessary 
for a person to remember events and, as 
we shall see, a high level of brain energy 
consumption is needed for a person to be in 
a state of consciousness. On the other hand 
by postulating that a mental activity called 
“working memory” is responsible for a per-
son remembering something we are sacri-
ficing a connection between observables (a 
particular pre-frontal brain region becomes 
more active when the person is performing 
a particular act) for a less reliable theory 
of mental activities. Instead of treating the 
brain as a material body, subject to physical 
laws, studies of postulated mental processes 
like working memory serve psychological 
ideas about why chemical brain processes 
occur. In doing so, scientific method is 
led astray by abstract concepts – powerful 
ones – where contingent hypotheses, in this 
case from psychology, are taken as having 
substantive and discreet reality.
PragMatisM and the Meaning of 
words
When we do an experiment that looks for 
the brain location of working memory, 
it becomes evident that how we theorize 
about and name a phenomenon – such 
as “working memory” – is an important 
framework within which brain science – 
all science – works. Fortunately, in contrast 
to the philosophers and psychologists who 
assume they know what is meant by men-
tal processes like working memory, there 
are other philosophers who caution us 
about the use of words – proposing that 
words only have meaning to the extent they 
influence action. These pragmatists advise 
us not to assume we actually understand 
something simply because we have a word 
for it.
The pragmatist philosopher William 
James (1995) wrote how it is a mistake to 
look to words to help understand mysteries: 
You know how men have always hankered 
after unlawful magic, and you know what 
a great art, in magic, WORDS have always 
played, If you have his name or the formula 
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able, inheritable traits, like the red eyes of 
Drosophila, to molecular studies.
a different aPProach to the study 
consciousness
In following the successes carved out by 
Crick and Watson I propose that to explore 
consciousness we should find a physi-
cal, brain activity that is necessary for the 
person to show the observable activities 
of consciousness. Studying that physical, 
molecular activity should, in time, reveal 
more aspects of a person’s activity while in 
the state of consciousness – just as the DNA 
structure opened pathways for the study of 
inheritance. We have proposed how this can 
be done in a preliminary report (Shulman 
et al., 2009) sketching a method of studying 
consciousness that relates a physical prop-
erty, in this case the high brain energy, to an 
observable, the person’s activities in a state 
of consciousness, which had not yet been 
described in molecular terms. The explora-
tion follows upon the investigation of the 
philosophical foundations of neuroscience, 
the title of a path-breaking book by Bennett 
and Hacker (2003). Their main point is 
that “It is not the brain that is conscious or 
unconscious, but the person whose brain it 
is…. One sees with one’s eyes and hears with 
one’s ears, but one is not conscious with 
one’s brain.” This clarification means that 
the definition of consciousness depends 
upon something the person does such as 
his response to stimuli, and while certain 
brain activity can be necessary to maintain 
the person in the state of consciousness the 
brain does not do consciousness. A person’s 
actions of consciousness, they propose, can 
be broken into two forms of which we are 
concerned with the first. Following con-
ventions in the field we call this form the 
state of consciousness which they define as 
“a matter of being conscious or awake as 
opposed to being unconscious or asleep.” 
The state of consciousness is my concern 
because it a third person observable state. 
There is no mystery or contingency in say-
ing that a person is in a state of conscious-
ness when we see him responding to stimuli 
– anesthesiologists do it all the time and 
their conclusion is the basis of important 
clinical decisions. My argument is that once 
a person can be defined as being in the state 
of consciousness by observing his response 
to stimuli – as done routinely by the anes-
terms. The DNA structure became the basis 
of a new field of study, molecular genet-
ics, which will continue the study of the 
many steps of inheritance, e.g., meiosis, 
development, and phenotype expression, 
in molecular terms (Keller, 2000). In this 
role DNA actually serves as the beginning 
of biochemical research into the processes 
of heredity. The observable inheritance of 
many physical properties like the red eye 
in Drosophila now can be explained at the 
molecular level starting with the DNA 
sequence just as the observable sweet smell 
identifying Diabetes now can be explained 
by the metabolism of glucose. But con-
sciousness is not an observable – it was a 
concept presumed to underlie a person’s 
behavior. It was of a different category than 
the gene and there is no reason to believe 
that advances in biology have suddenly 
made it understandable in molecule terms. 
Hence the role of DNA in providing mecha-
nisms for actions attributed to the gene is 
very different from how Crick proposes 
to explain that “You, your joys and your 
sorrows, and your ambitions, your sense 
of personal identity and free will are in 
fact no more than the behavior of a vast 
assembly of nerve cells and their associated 
molecules” (Crick, 1994d).
My second criticism is that Francis Crick 
and Jim Watson never studied the gene, 
although their results have important con-
sequences for understanding the process 
of heritability. They studied base pairing, 
hydrophobic interactions of phosphates, 
X-ray diffraction patterns, and possible 
structural models of the DNA molecule. 
Their structural studies of a chemical mol-
ecule, that had been known to be involved 
in genetic processes, changed our under-
standing of genetics and biology for all time. 
But they did not study the gene. Although 
the gene was a description of the observable 
processes of inheritance those processes had 
not been described in molecular terms and 
could not be studied directly. When Crick 
suggests that molecular studies are a useful 
method for explaining consciousness he is 
asking us to do something quite different 
from what he and Watson did. In brain 
studies I suggest we should do what Crick 
and Watson actually did, not what Crick 
subsequently proposed. They studied the 
properties of a molecule that previously 
had been shown to play a necessary role 
in the observable transmission of genetic 
In advocating the explanation of con-
sciousness at the neural level he writes 
that such reductionism is “not the rigid 
processes of explaining one set of ideas 
in terms of another fixed set of ideas at 
a lower level, but a dynamic interactive 
process that modifies the concepts at 
both levels as the knowledge develops” 
(Crick, 1994b). He recognizes that since 
Descartes the mental and the material have 
been considered to be separate, incom-
mensurate domains, but claims that this 
method of explaining a system property 
at the chemical level does not involve a 
“category mistake.” He acknowledges that 
the mental and material have been consid-
ered to be of different categories and that 
proposing to explain one in terms of the 
other has been considered to be a mistake 
(the familiar body–mind  problem), but he 
claims that recent advances in reductionist 
studies have enabled science to overcome 
these categorical differences. In support of 
this hypothesis, he notes that in earlier days 
the problem of a reductionist approach 
“could have taken the form that to con-
sider a gene to be a molecule (or as we 
should say now, a part of a matched pair 
of molecules) would be a category mistake. 
A gene is one category and a molecule is a 
quite different category. One can see now 
how hollow such objections have turned 
out to be” (Crick, 1994c). In my opinion, 
this statement, made in the optimistic early 
days of the Human Genome Project assert-
ing that the DNA molecule explained the 
gene, is misleading in two important ways.
First Crick proposes that the gene which 
has been explained by DNA is of the same 
category as consciousness and thereby sets 
an example for his goal to reduce con-
sciousness to molecules. However the gene, 
at the beginning of Crick and Watson’s 
studies, had been defined by observations 
as the fundamental unit of inheritance 
(Encyclopedia Britannica, 1932). The prop-
erties of genes were observables – Mendel’s 
pea shoots reflected genes for yellow or 
green peas while the genes identified in 
Morgan’s fruit flies controlled the inherit-
ance of red eyes and other observable traits. 
In this important respect the gene differed 
from consciousness which Crick acknowl-
edged could not be defined by observation. 
The explication of the DNA structure pro-
vides a way to study the processes of inher-
itance attributed to the gene in molecular 
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the questions that behaviorism felt to be 
beyond the capability of psychology, we 
have relied upon neurophysiological stud-
ies of brain energy and work for insights 
into neuronal support of observable behav-
ioral activities.
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